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That many sorts of factors other than an in-
tended efficient association with sales can in-
fluence ownership has appeared and reap-
peared in the examination of the function that
stocks serve in Part I. For one thing, targets
are not met, so that changes in stocks reflect
errors rather than intentions of any sort (ex-
cept the intention not to pay the price of
strict enforcement). The opportunity cost of
flexibility in production or sales may have its
impact on the uses to which stocks are put;
these costs change in the course of business
fluctuation and thereby change the desirable
volume of stocks. The costs of stocks them-
selves can alter during business fluctuation,
thus inducing changes in the size of stocks,
other things the same. But the difficulty of
giving these influences statistical form means
that they must be largely ignored for the
present. We are forced to look, not where
ideally we would like to, but where the light
is good. And the light shines, or at least glim-
mers, on market prospects.
Changing market prospects can be thought
of as influencing primarily the timing of buy-
ing. Goods which in any event are expected
to be needed at some particular time do not
need to be bought at exactly that time minus
a fixed interval—a uniform period required
for their delivery and preparation. Instead
they can be bought quite a bit earlier if there
is reason to do so. On the other hand, they
can be bought as close to the time when
they are needed as possible; or since inven-
tories can be drawn down, they may not for
the time being be bought at all. The point
is simply that there is what may be called
a "period of option" with respect to the tim-
ing of buying. The way in which this option
is exercised is influenced by market prospects.
REASONS FOR MARKET-ORIENTED SHIFTS IN THE TIMING
OF BUYING
Changingconditionsinthemarketsin
which materials or merchandise are bought
can affect the time when goods are purchased,
goods which are in any event expected to be
needed for resale or processing. Conditions
in materials markets capable of influencing
the timing of buying are doubtless of many
sorts, but perhaps three dominate. They con-
cern: (1) expected price of materials (this in-
cludes payment terms and free services as well
as explicit price), (2) delivery periods and the
buyers' confidence that deliveries will be made
when promised,(3)quality, in general or
with respect to particularized specifications,
the range of selections, and the buyers' con-
fidence that standards will be met. Though
all of these matters can theoretically be re-
duced to a price differential, I believe that
they are actually thought of by business as
particular sorts of penalties or advantages, and
therefore they are best considered separately.
If conditicns change or are expected to
change, how does the buyer behave? We can
consider the question with respect to tighten-178 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
ing markets without burdening the discussion
with the counterpart of these statements cover-
ing slackening markets.
With respectto prices,itisanticipated
rather than actual change which theoretically
governs actions. Starting with a volume of
stock which is efficient, assuming that prices
and other market conditions are stable, the
increase that is justified by an expectation of
a stipulated rise in prices is a negative func-
tion of the cost of carrying the additional stock
and a positive function of the expected change
in price over the relevant period of anticipa-
tion, discounted for uncertainty. Extension in
stock is justified as long as the positive ad-
vantage of further extension is greater than
the associated cost. Thus the level of stock
is governed by the change in prices. Since
this point plays some part in later discussions,
a brief illustration may be in order.
Suppose one month's supply is 100 units
and it costs $9 to carry 100 units for one
month. One month's supply is the normal
physical requirement for efficient servicing of
sales. Then, if prices are expected to increase
10 cents a unit over the next month, the pur-
chase price of the 100 units would be $10 less
if the goods were bought now than if they
were bought one month later, when they
would in any event be required. Sinceit
would cost $9 to hold the extra supply, there
would be a net saving of $1 and the advance
purchase might be made if all costs were in-
cluded and forecasts were, miraculously, be-
lieved to be certain. If, next month, prices
were again expected to rise 10 cents, only the
usual one month's supply could be purchased,
sinceto do so would maintainthetwo
months' level of stock with its attendant cost.
If in the following month prices were ex-
pected to cease rising, there would be no buy-
ing since ownership should be reduced to the
pre-riseone month'slevelbecausethere
would now be no offset to the $9 carrying
cost of the extra month's stock. The level of
price-linked stock, then, is a function of first
differences in prices, other things, including
uncertainty, the same.
Whether the identical logic applies to goods
outstanding as well as to stocks on hand de-
pends on whether there is a definable cost to
holding goods on order. Certainly, since financ-
ing and storage costs typically do not com-
mence until deliveries are received, the cost of
holding goods on order is less, other things the
same, than that of goods on hand. Perhaps the
major cost of outstandings is that of risk—risk
of buying goods that cannot be used at all or
used as advantageously as some alternative.
For these costs, whatever they are, the same
logic would apply as previously sketched for
stocks. Thus purchases to anticipate a rising
price should ideally remain undelivered as
long as feasible, since the cost of making a bet
that prices will rise is thereby minimized. In
any event, an increase in stocks on order is
likely to involve, before long, at least some
increase in stocks, and thereby blur the dis-
tinction.
If the buyer fears that his quality specifica-
tions will not be met, his defense again con-
sists of anticipation of the event. Since quality
deterioration is actually a de facto price in-
crease, the response would be governed in the
manner just described.
In connection with a change in delivery
periods,eitheractualor expected change
would presumably elicit a similar response.
Goods on order would be increased to cover
the same number of weeks' supply, but for
the longer period—the new replenishment pe-
riod. The delivery period is in effect a "proc-
ess time," as discussed in Part I, and as ex-
plained there, stock which serves to bridge
process time typically needs to increase pro-
portionately to change in process time. In ad-
dition, the longer replenishment period de-
mands somewhat greater insurance stocks on
hand as well as on order. Thus ownership as-
sociated with this function would presumably
increase slightly more than proportionately
to a change in replenishment time, other10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS 179
things the same. This remark would apply to
expected replenishment time, except that it
might be discounted for uncertainty.
The previous paragraph assumes that there
are no alternatives to the increase in delivery
periods. But actually, of course, there are.
Many sorts of materials may be purchased
from the same, or more probably other, sup-
pliers at a price high enough to command
swift delivery. The price ordinarilyis not
simply a monetary one, since it may imply
poorer service or other penalties.It seems
likely, therefore, that if producers feel quite
sure that delivery periods will lengthen, they
will often prefer to purchase ahead, because
the carrying cost, including risk, will often be
less than the penalty of buying later for swift
delivery.
However, often this preference cannot be
exercised. For one thing, suppliers may not
be willing to fill up their future plant capacity
at current prices. They may worry that buying
is unrealistically extended and therefore that
orders will not remain firm or that returns
and requests for delays and other concessions
will develop. Perhaps the most usual reason
for unwillingness to accept orders for longer
delivery is simply that orders are already suf-
ficient to plan future output efficiently over
the convenient planning horizon. If the regular
suppliers are not willing to write advance
orders, goods must be picked up for prompt
delivery elsewhere.
Purchases for prompt delivery also may con-
stitute the part of response to expectations of
lengthening replenishment periods sincea
transaction period needs to be covered. Ma-
terials are in a sense running away from the
purchaser when delivery periods lengthen, and
he may have to buy some ready supplies to
sustain him while he catches the withdrawing
ones.
These paragraphs imply that the response
to the expectation that delivery periods will
lengthen is very likely to be not only an in-
crease in advance orders but also an increase
in purchases for immediate delivery, and con-
sequently of materials stocks on hand. This is
true even if we assume that expectations are
held with assurance.
But, of course, expectations seldom are sure.
For example, if purchasing agents are not very
sure that markets will tighten, they may prefer
not to extend commitments but to take a
chance on having to pay premium prices for
swift delivery if and when actual tightness de-
velops. They exchange a sure cost of advance
buying for a possible cost of a premium price.
In connection with the possibility of prices
rising, uncertainty reduces the degree of ex-
tension that a purchaser would undertake. In
connection with the possibility of a fall in
prices or a shortening of delivery periods, un-
certainty reduces the degree of retrenchment
that is undertaken. In other words, in deciding
by how much to alter his positions on the
basis of judgments about market conditions,
the expected gain is discounted for uncer-
tainty and therefore the action taken is less
than it would be were expectations sure.1
I have been discussing various manifesta-
tions of changes in market conditions and this
implies the conceptual frame of "other things
the same." But the introduction of uncer-
tainty plays havoc with this handy conceptual
tool. Over a period of months when business
is expanding or contracting, the presence of
uncertainty changes what is done; but un-
certainty is itself changed by what is done.
How then can one abstract from such change
in order "to hold it the same"?
Two other factors that are likely to change
concurrently with actual or expected market
conditions are the cost of capital, which is rele-
vant to stocks of goods on hand, and the cost
of the risk of buying goods that are not needed,
1Pricetheory distinguishes between the character
of risk premium for buyers and for sellers. It is assumed
that buyers consider themselves more vulnerable to
an error of underestimating a fall in price than of
overestimating a rise;the opposite assymetry applies
to a seller's reactions. See Oscar Lange, Price Flexibility
and Employment, Bloomington, md., 1944, pp. 3G. 31.180 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
which is relevant to stocks either on hand or
on order. This occurs, for example, when there
is a change in the backlog of sales orders, "back
orders" that a manufacturer has on hand. If
materials are bought to cover an order which
is on the books, the chances of buying materi-
als that will not be used are minimal. For du-
rable goods manufacturers these back orders
are, as we have seen, both potentially large
and highly variable. Their size, accordingly,
can alter the risk cost of changes in outstand-
ing purchase orders or stock on hand.'
I have mentioned three major sortsof
changes that can prompt a change in owner-
ship position—actual or expected change in
materials prices,' in quality, or in replenish-
ment time. But it seems characteristic of mar-
ket behavior that all of these changes tend to
occur at the same time. An individual buyer
can, therefore, view his problems in any or
all of these ways and still be impelled to do
the same thing at the same time.
These notions about the factors that in-
fluence market prospects imply changes in
purchasing behavior. Is there evidence that
such changes actually occurred?
We want to examine the time series, first, to
see whether there are indications that changes
in market conditions appear to have been
associated with changes in ownership. To do
so requires that the impact of changing levels
of sales of the company's product has been re-
moved from the ownership statistics. Second,
we want to try to learn which causal factors
may, on the basis of the evidence, have played
some part in the over-all changes in owner-
ship that took place. Needless to say, the data
can at best be suggestive.
Data for the durable goods industries are
examined first and followed by the meager
materials for department stores. The last sec-
tion of the chapter addresses itself to the fre-
quently asked question whether changing con-
ditions of supply are primarily responsible for
changing market expectations, and the role of
capacity limitations is examined. These in-
vestigations, along with those of the previous
chapter, prepare the way to tackle in the fol-
lowing chapter the slippery problem of the
interrelations among the whole battery of in-
fluences that interact to create the inventory
cycle.
OUTSTANDING ORDERS AND MARKET CONDITIONS
The most direct response to changing market
conditions is the change in ownership of ma-
terials. The two parts, stocks and outstandings,
can supplement or substitute for one another.
Eut following the logic of the previous dis-
cussion, changes in stocks on order probably
representalower-costresponsethando
changes in stocks on hand. Accordingly, out-
standings may react more sensitively to chang-
ing conditions. In any event, evidence on the
impact of market conditions afforded by stocks
on order is not as confused by other matters
(the level of sales or of production, and failure
of expectations to come true) as is the evidence
of stocks on hand. Consequently we examine
the two parts of ownership separately and
focus particularly on outstanding orders.
Cascaded Order Terms
Just how total outstanding orders change is
complicated and it is necessary to understand
it before looking at the evidence. Outstandings
at any given time have typically been ordered
at different times, not only because the in-
terval between orders is usually shorter than
an average delivery period, but because de-
livery periods themselves vary for groups of
items on order.
Retailers, for example, will often order some
portion of the expected requirements of style
goods for the "season" at the time when lines
are first shown by manufacturers. The propor-
tion of these "preseason orders" may for some
lines be as high as 70 per cent and for others10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS 181
as low as perhaps 30 per cent of the expected
season's requirements. The proportion varies
with types of merchandise and market condi-
tions. Order terms for these purchases may
be, say, two months or more. Other purchases
will occur as requirements clarify and selling
needs move closer. These "secondary orders"
may, to pick an illustrative figure, be placed
for delivery in four to six weeks. Finally, re-
tailers' "fill-in orders" or "at-once orders" may
reflect last-minute needs of several sorts. Man-
ufacturers, on the other hand, may tend to
order all of some sorts of materials and none
of other sorts for relatively distant delivery,
so that the range of order terms may tend
to apply primarily to different materials and
only secondarily to portions of the total re-
quirements of each.
The Structure of Ownership
Procedures, in other words, differ widely.
But in one way or another, a variety of de-
livery terms is likely to be usual for all ma-
terials outstanding at a given time. The range
of these terms and their relative importance
in total outstandings will shift as market con-
ditions change. It will be useful to consider
briefly just how these shifts, associated with the
severalsortsof conditions that affect out-
standings, gradually envelop the totals of ma-
terials on order at given times. For this pur-
pose an illustrative example is required.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
Consider the composition of ownership with
respect to two aspects of each item bought:
the time when it was ordered and the time
when it is generally expected to move to pro-
duction or selling floors. Ten units are bought
each period and they are distributed with
respect to del.ivery period in the following
way: 3 units immediate, 5 units at end of
two periods, 2 units at end of four periods.
In a retail store a distribution of this sort
could mean that of the estimated requirements
for the season, some 30 per cent was bought
for immediate delivery, 20 per cent when lines
were first shown, and 50 per cent at an inter-
mediate time. In a manufacturing establish-
ment it might represent the relative impor-
tance of various products characterized by
different delivery conditions, though some of
the cascaded aspect may also apply. The fig-
ures are merely illustrative of the point that
some materials and some portion of most
major materials are bought further ahead than
others. "A period" can conveniently be visu-
alized as two weeks.
Assume orders are placed at the beginning
of a period; "immediate delivery" occurs at
the end of the period (beginning of period
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2). One period is required for preparation,
so the earliest that these items which are pur-
chased (time 0) can enter production is dur-
ing period 3.Maintainingthe same differential,
those bought for delivery two periods hence
arrive at the end of period 3, and so are
ready for use during period 5; those bought
for four-period delivery arrive at the end of
period 5 and are ready for use during period
7.
Assumingthere has been no change in this
pattern of buying for seven periods, then the
48 units on hand and on order are analyzed,
with respect to when they were bought, in the
two right-hand columns. Thus 10 units, or
20.8 per cent of total ownership, were bought
in each of the recent periods, whereas two
units, or 4.2 per cent, were bought as long as
six periods ago. The 48 units can also be
analyzed with respect to when they are to be
used, and the bottom two lines show that
some goods presently on order will not be
used, under the circumstances described, until
seven periods hence. Each column shows when
each item then sold or entering production
was bought.
RESPONSE TO CHANGING SALES OR ORDER TERMS
If sales are presently expected to increase,
the figures in the first line of the example will
be increased, and it may well be that orders
for immediate delivery (column 3,line1)
will be increased more. But if the new level of
sales is expected to hold, longer-term orders
(columns 5 and 7)wouldalso rise. If expec-
tations are realized, and the new level is main-
tained, other lines would be changed to cover
the larger sales expectations, though now the
usual proportions of orders of each term might
be reconstituted. After sufficienttime had
elapsed for all of the table's lines to alter,
the increase in outstandings should be ap-
proximately proportionate to the increase in
sales (assuming that nothing else affecting pro-
curement had changed). The proportionate
relationship is a function of the fact that out-
standings associated with delivery periods are
largely "process-time stocks"asdefined in
Chapter 2.2 However, note that if sales con-
tinue to rise (rather than simply to maintain
the new level), outstandings will rise less than
proportionately to sales unless the continuing
increases are anticipated in advance orders.
Ifitis market expectations rather than
sales volume that is expected to change, the
relative weights of the several order terms
are likely to shift. Thus materials covered
in column 7 of line1 might increase—more
goods would be placed for delivery five periods
hence. This could reflect (1) the unwilling-
ness of suppliers to write orders for shorter
terms, (2) purchasers' expectations that prices
might rise, and the concomitant wish to fix
prices sooner rather than later (3) the pur-
chasers' fear that if one waited to place the
usual three-period and one-period orders, the
proper schedule of receipts could not be relied
upon. This means that the number of units
ordinarily purchasedfor advance delivery
would be increased. It might even be that
an order of still longer term would be placed
—it would appear in the example in a new
column 9 to the right of the present table.
However, if only the relative distribution
of order terms changed, so that the new longer-
term orders were placed at the expense of the
new shorter-term ones, there would be a de-
ficiency in receipts during the period when
the shorter orders would ordinarily have been
moving into stock. Since this is undesirable,
perhaps the additional long-term orders often
constitute an absolute increase in procure-
ment. If so, outstandings would increase im-
mediately and stocks would increase only when
these longer-term orders started to reach their
delivery dates.
This line of thought bears on the observa-
tions of earlier chapters that the lead of out-
standings relative to stocks seemed longer than
the length of the average period that goods
remain on order could explain. The reason
2Theywould presumably increaseslightly more
than proportionately insofar as the need for insurance
stocks rises somewhat with the volume of sales.10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS 183
here suggested is that it is not so much the
length of the average delivery period as the
period characterizing that fraction of all ma-
terials ordered well in advance which is criti-
cal. For it is the latter that will determine
when an increase in outstandings associated
with changing market expectations is likely to
affect the size of stocks on hand, other things
the same. However, as usual, other things may
well not be the same. Particularly, stocks may
tend to be drawn down by unexpectedly high
requirements for sales or production starts at
just the times when heavier long-term orders
are placed. If so, this would further contribute
to the lead of outstandings relative to stocks.
Suggestive evidence on this point appears in
the last section of this chapter.
To summarize, four analytic components
of change in the level of materials outstand-
ing can be identified. Consider their applica-
tion to an increase (comparable remarks apply
toa decrease):(1)Sales plus the desired
change in stocks on hand at all stations in-
crease, and orders of each term increase pro-
portionately. (2) The relative weight in all
purchases of those of each order term shift in
a fashion that increases the average period
that goods remain outstanding.
Two other cases which are in a sense special
instances of item 2 are worth separating out:
(3) The delivery terms for major materials
that must be bought ahead lengthen; that is,
the terms of the longest-term orders of any
consequence become longer than they previ-
ously were.(4) The delivery terms on the
shortest orders of any consequence become
longer than they previously were; that is, "at
once" orders for some sorts of materials be-
come in effect orders for two-week or thirty-
day delivery.
Number of Months' Supply
Since market prospects are the subject under
investigation, it is necessary to focus on those
changes in outstandings that are associated
with market conditions rather than with the
changing levels of sales or production. To
do so it is necessary to make some sort of an
assumption about the influence of salesif
market conditions were unchanging. More-
over, the influence of sales ought to be re-
moved at a low level of market prospects—
one that characterizes a buyers' market when
purchasing is "hand-to-mouth." The assump-
tion that I would like to make first, then, is
the one previously made (Tables 33 and 34)
in connection with ownership—that the impact
of sales is given by a constant outstandings-
sales ratio when that ratio is at its cyclical low.
As indicated in the previous chapter, this is
by no means an ideal solution, but it is less
disagreeable in connection with outstandings,
which have such a large element of "process-
time stock," especially when business is slack,
than with stocks on hand or even total owner-
ship. In any event, it is the best that we can
do.
DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURERS
For durables, the trough level of the ratio
averaged about .9 for the durable goods group;
adjusted for value added in the sales dollar,
it comes to about 1.8, or a bit short of eight
weeks' supply. Accepting this relation between
outstandings and shipment as the level that
would be maintained if hand-to-mouth con-
ditions persisted, then, were buying to stay
on this basis, the outstandings-shipment ratio
would be a horizontal line drawn at the .9
level were as-
sumed to conform to the downward trend in
the ratio, this norm would be represented by
a downward sloping line which was about at
the 1.15 level in 1949 and the .75 level in
3Strictly,this statement applies to a ratio dated a
bit differently. Outstandings during the current months
provide for shipments a suffident number of weeks
hence to allow for the completion of receipt and
production. However, since the period shifts, it seems
necessary to ignore the matter.
4Thecalculation is not very sensitive to the actual
hand-to-mouth levelthat ispicked. The ups and
downs in the ratio, and thus the general contours of184 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
Instead, Chart 10 shows, of course, that the
ratioisactually a wavy line. We inquire
whether the contours of the curve seem to re-
flect evidence of changing market conditions
and if so what more can be learned of the
sorts of conditions, sorts of responses, and as-
sociated factors.
Chart 10 compares the ratio, top curve, with
several series that concern conditions in the
metals markets. The second and third curves
are based on a remarkable body of informa-
tion collected by the Chicago Association of
Purchasing Agents. It consists of answers to
monthly questionnaires sent to two hundred
companies, the large majority of which are
manufacturers of durable goods.5 Vendor per-
formance, the second curve on the chart, fo-
cuses fairly sharply on the length of time re-
quired for materials to be received after they
have been ordered. It is a cumulated diffusion
index of the number of purchasing agents
who report that the delivery period for major
commodities is lengthening.6 Thus it concen-
trates on what, at least to the buyer, ap-
non-sales-linkedsupply,remainunalteredifthe
hand-to-mouth position is designated as either higher
or lower than the eight weeks' supply. Indeed the level
might be realistically assumed to have a downward
trend. This statement does not apply if the desired
minimum is defined as an incremental association be-
tween sales and outstandings which differs from the
average desired level. If the incremental association is
less than the average, the average ratio will tend to
decline when sales rise and vice versa.
5 In 1961, an officer of the association was kind
enough to supply the following figures concerning
the number of firms in the sample:
Durable goods manufacturers 152
Non-durable or semi-durable goods manufacturers39
Retailers 9
6 The questionnaire asked whether deliveries made
by vendors are "faster, slower, the same." A diffusion
index was computed by adding the percentage re-
porting slower deliveries and one-half of the per-
centage reporting that they stayed the same.
This series, likeall diffusion indexes,is roughly
similar to a rate of change in data proper. (It differs
from a rate of change in that each rise or fall is of
identical size.) To glimpse what the data proper might
have shown, the diffusion index was cumulated. Thus
it portrays whether vendor performance is generally
deteriorating (the curve rising) or improving (the curve
falling).
pears to be a supplier-induced impact on
his purchasing policy. Suppliers are deliver-
ing faster when the curve rises and slower
when it falls. It probably focuses on the "ana-
lytic component" number 4—a change in the
order term of advance deliveries.
The average term of purchase orders, the
third curve, presumably combines this sup-
plier-initiated characteristic of delivery peri-
ods with levels that might result from the
purchasers' decision to buy farther ahead than
usual for any one of the many reasons previ-
ously mentioned. But the reports doubtless
focus on the major materials for which order
terms change from time to time.7 Thus the
data probably cover not so much the "analytic
component" number 2 as number 4 applied
to a wider range of order terms. The terms
averaged 2.2 months at peaks and 1.2at
troughs.
Both of these indicators of market condi-
tions have the three and a half movements
that characterize the ratio.8 Table 35 gives
measures of correspondence between the ratio
and the two indicators of market conditions.
For both, the proportion of months in like
phase is high—88 months for the level of
The series was constructed in the following way.
One question on the Chicago Purchasing Agents ques-
tionnaire asks, "How far in advance must you buy in
ordertohave principal materials on hand when
needed: 0 to 30 days, 30 to 60 days, 60 to 90 days,
90 days or longer?" We constructed the index by using
the percentage reporting each of the four delivery
terms as weights for the average term included in
the category. The average term was taken in the
center of each 30 day period. Thus, 0 to 30 days was
considered 15 days, or .5. The index, in other words,
isa weighted-average delivery period interms of
months of supply.
S I refer to the movements terminating in 1949, for
which the. downward phase only is shown, the next two
complete cycles, plus the movement starting in the
beginning of1959. Though outstandings recede in
1960 from the levels stimulated, at least in part, by
the steel strike, the downward trend in the ratio and
the ambiguity resulting from the shift in the statistical
series mean that no terminal trough could be marked.
Apparently the rise in outstandings at that time (see
Chart1)is not sufficiently greater, proportionately,
than that of shipments to be clearly identified as a
cycle in the ratio.CHART 10
Note: Shaded areas represent business contractions. Specific cycle turns are marked by dots.
aCumulateddiffusion index, Chicago Purchasing Agents Association data.b Based on
CPAA data, see text. cIndexof spot-market prices of five metals.d Corporate profits
before taxes, durable goods manufacturers, FTC, SEC data.
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TABLE 35
Timing: Ratio of Outstandings Materials Orders to Shipments and Selected Data,
Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1946—61
Section A: Months Lead (—)orLag (+) for Matched Turnsa
Chronologyb
Reference P T P T P T' P T P T P T
Line SeriesC (1/47) (7/47)11/48 10/49 (2/51) (6/52) 7/53 8/54 7/57 4/58 5/60 2/61
Specific Series: Ratio of Materials Outstandings to Shipments, Durables
1Business cycles —1 —24 —1 -12 +8 —6
2Subcycles —1 +5 —1 —12 +8 —6
Specific Series: Level of Vendor Performance
3Business cycles —25 —2 —27+1 —19 +4 —5+5
4Subcycles —3 —2 +2 +1 —19 +4 —5 +5
5R: materials
outstanding to
shipments, dur. 0 —1 —3 0 0+2 7 4 +1
Specific Series:Average Term of Purchase Orders
6Business cycles —31 -4 —30 4 —22 —1 _5 +1
7Subcycles —9 4 —1 4 —22 —1 —5 +1
8R: materials
outstanding to
shipments, dur. 0 0 —3 —6 0 0 —3 —10 —9 +1
Specific Series: Metals, Spot Prices
9Business cycles +1 +5 —30 —6 —15 0 —6 —2
10Subcycles —10 +1 +5 —1 —6 —15 0 —6 —2
11R: materials
outstanding to
shipments dur. 0 +6 -6 0 0_5 3 —8 0 3
12Average term of
purchase orders +9 0 0 —2 +7 +1 —1 —3
Specific Series: Corporate Profits
13Business cycles 0 —5 —2 —9 —20 +1 —12 0
14Subcycles 0 5 —3 +2 —2 —9 —20 +1 —12 0
15R: materials
outstanding to -
shipments,dur 0 —4 —8 —8 —8 —7 —6
16Average term of
purchase orders ® —1 —2 —5 +2 +2 —7 —1





















Specific Series: Ratio of Materials Outstandings to Shipments, Durables
1Business cycles 5 10 —14.0+2.03.56.7 4.08.05.3 0 51 57
2Subcycles 420 —4.3+2.0—1.06.2 4.05.25.1 0 63 60
Specific Series:Level of Vendor Performance
3Business cycles 530 —22.0+2.5—3.57.0 2.5 10.5 —3,—4,—5 55 56
4Subcycles 440 —4.0+2.5—0.55.8 2.55.14.1 0 62 62
5R: materials
outstanding to
shipments, dur. 420 —3.0—1.0—2.02.7 2.02.7 2.31,2,3 88 89
Specific Series: Average Term of Purchase Orders
6Business cycles 710 —26.0—2.5—4.58.5 2.0 10.0 6.0 4,5 57 63
7Subcycles 710 —7.0—2.5—4.06.2 2.04.44.1 4 66 68
8R: materials
outstanding to
shipments, dur. 510 —5.0—5.0—4.54.0 2.73.3 3.3 87 86
Specific Series: Metals, Spot Prices
9Business cycles 521 —10.5—1.0—4.010.0 3.27.66.5 —3,—4 64
10Subcycles 621 —3.5—2.7—3.05.1 4.34.84.7 —3,—4 70
11R: materials
outstanding to
shipments, dur. 511 —3.0 —4.0 2.0 4.03.2 3.1
12Average term of
purchase orders 341 +3.5.—O.5+0.510.0 3.86.96.9 0, +1 69 77h
Specific Series: Corporate Profits
13Business cycles 512 —7.0—2.5—3.57.5 3.85.65.6 —6 60
14Subcycles 622 —5.7—1.3—2.56.5 3.75.0 4.1 —6 66
15R:materials
outstanding to
shipments, dur. 600 —7.3—6.3—7.50.9 1.51.21.2 83h
16Averageterm of
purchaseorders5 30 0 —1.0—1.010.5 1.86.16.1 —1 70 77188 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
Notes to Table 35
aSpecific seriesare matched with the indi-
cated reference series (see note c) in accord-
ance with the standard NBER rules. A double
relaxation of rules is marked r;it applies to
cases for well-conforming series in which two
like turns are matched, though an unlike turn
lies between them. The figureis underlined
when subcycle chronologyisthe reference
series, a minor cycle in the specific series has
entered a comparison; or, when two individual
series are compared, a minor cycle in either
series has entered a comparison.When the
business cycle chronology provides the refer-
ence, minor specific cycle turns are ignored.
The meaning of other symbols is:
turn in the reference series does not ap-
pear in the specific series.
turn in the specific series does not appear
in the reference series.
0 there is no turn in either series in the
neighborhood of the chronology date.
bChronologydates are business cycle ref-
erence dates. In addition, four minor suboycle
dates, enclosed in parentheses, are added to
form a subcycle chronology.
CRefeee seriesare of three sorts:(1) the
business cycle chronology as shown in column
heads,excluding the datesinparentheses;
(2) the subcycle chronology as shown in all
column heads; (3) particular series whose spe-
cific cycles and minor cycles constitute the
vendor performance and 87 months for the
order term.9
Outstandings continue to rise not only ab-
solutely but relative to sales (the ratio rises)
for about a quarter of a year after these two
indicators of market conditions, particularly
o Again, the implications of the actual percentage
of months in phase need to be evaluated in terms of
the number of movements and the correspondence of
both series to general business conditions. The first
criterion would in this case discount the significance
of the comparisons since the number of movements is
small. The second would increase it sinceallthree
series have a very poor conformity to business cycles
or subcycles (see the first two lines for each of the
three measures in Table 35). As a result, any relation
of the series to one another is not likely to be pro-
duced by their common relationto major business
conditions.
reference dates for the comparison.
dThenumber of months during which the
specific series is in like phase with the ref-
erence series is expressed as a percentage of
the total number of months covered between
dates as given.
eMedian is theaverage timing of the center
two or three turns.
deviation from the median.The
"weighted" (wt'd)averageisthe deviation
from the median for peaks and for troughs sep-
arately, weighted by the number of turns.
determining monthsinlikephase a
timing adjustment is made which maximizes
confluence.Before counting the months in
phase, the specific series is in effect moved
to the right to allow for a lead and to the left to
allow for a lag if by so doing the percentage of
months in like phase (as rounded) is increased.
If the months in phase are as large or larger
without an adjustment, this is indicated by a
"timing adjustment" of 0.
In some cases we wish to know the per-
centage of months in phase on a synchronous
basis, regardless of whether the percentage in
phase is thereby maximized. If so, the "timing
adjustment" is given as "none."
hForthe period 1/49—12/61, the percentage
of months during which line 11 was in phase
was 80 per cent; line 12, 83 per cent; and line
15, 89 per cent.
the second, indicate some slackening in market
tension. Analogously, at recessions, producers
continue to decrease the volume of goods on
hand and on order, both absolutely and rela-
tively to sales, for a number of months after
more purchasing agents report improved than
report worsened performance. One can find
several reasons for the lag, but they are all too
problematical to propose as an explanation.'°
10Ithink of the following possibilities. Purchasers
may request postponement of deliveries at peaks and a
hastening of them at troughs. The cessation of an in-
crease in the longest delivery terms to which the CPA
data relate does not necessarily, as explained in the
previous section, mean that total outstandings will de-
crease,since an increase inorders of intermediate
term can accompany and perhaps persist longer than
the increasing terms of the longest of advanced orders;10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS 189
The average order term also clearly exhibits
the motif of early thrust previously noted in
the materials-purchasing segment of the econ-
omy. From the time that order terms began
to expand to when their expansion reached
its maximum was 19, 17, and 20 months re-
spectively in the three major postwar cycles.
The increase appears to be continuous and
steady during the rise, and likewise during
the period of fall (though not quite as con-
sistently so). The time series has an unusually
triangular pattern.
Triangular patterns appear also in the out-
standings-shipment ratio and elsewherein
market-oriented data. Time series do not as
a rule rise or fall at a uniform rate right up
to the time when they reverse their direction.
Change ordinarily slows down before it re-
verses. The retardations, say at peaks, express
either reduced participation of firms in the
predominant pattern of change, or reduced
amount of change by each participant, or
both. The failure of data that focus on market
expectation to exhibit the usual amounts of
this reasonable behavior presents a puzzle
which needs to be unraveled. The last chapter
offers an explanation.
I conclude that the purchasing-agent data
suggest that market extension is associated in
part with the lengthening of delivery periods
by suppliers, and that buyers, whether for this
reason or others, purchase at least certain
principal materials farther ahead than before.
Is it possible to find hints in these time
series of motives for market extension other
than that of the changed delivery periods
which suppliers offer?
An expected rise in price would, as we have
noted, provide one reason, and expectations
may bear some relation to the actual spot-
market price of metals." After 1948, when
most of the recovery from war-time controls
an analogous logic might apply to troughs. Unexpected
change in sales may also play a part.
11 The following commodities are included:lead,
copper, scrap, steel ("heavy" and "Pittsburgh"), zinc,
tin.
had doubtless been completed, prices seemed
to bear a general family resemblance to the
other market-oriented series. However, their
measured correspondence to the ratio (Table
35, line 11) even beginning in 1949 shows
just 80 per cent of the months in phase with
the outstandings ratio. It is interesting to note
for later reference that prices tend to lead
the outstandings ratio. This is hard to explain
in terms of expected prices, which should, ac-
cording to the logic presented early in the
chapter, lag, since first differences, not the data
proper, should correspond with the level of
outstandings.
The risk involved in extending market posi-
tions is due in part to the possibility of buying
at the wrong price. But it is also due in part
to the possibility of buying an article that
will not be needed within a reasonable time,
or even at all. This second risk is virtually
eliminated if materials are bought for use in
connection with finished product for which
firm sales orders have been written. If so, out-
standings might be larger if backlogs of sales
orders were larger, other things the same.
However the volume of unfilled orders for
machineryandtransportationequipment
(consult Chart 1) appears to have little or
no relation to the data under examination,
nor does its conversion to months of sales alter
this fact. However, as we shall see in a mo-
ment, unfilled sales orders do have a different
sort of association with these data.
The bottom line of Chart 10 shows profits
before taxes for corporations in the durable
goods industries.'2 There appears to be a
provocative similarity between profits and the
rest of the events that have been described.
But profits lead the outstandings-shipment
12 Corporateprofitsbeforetaxes,durable goods
manufacturers, as computed inthe Federal Trade
Commission—SecuritiesandExchangeCommission
Series covering twelve durable goods industries. This
series replaces one compiled at the National Bureau by
Thor Hultgren which was used for all of our calcula-
tions. Turns are identical except that the trough in
1949 was in May rather than in November. Timing
comparisons are based on the former date rather than
on that of the series as charted.190 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
ratio by at least six months; in this they join
and exceed most of the other series that we
have been examining. The lead is regular; the
average deviation is only 1.2 months for the
six turns that are matched. Beginning in 1949,
89 per cent of the months are in like phase
after allowing for a lead of orders of some
seven or eight months (line 15). If this visual
similarity implies any causal relationship, it
is doubtless of a complex sort. Stocks of ma-
terials on order and on hand rise in response
in part to an additional volume of sales, and
higher volume ordinarily means higher prof-
its, too.
It may be that the volume of profits has
some direct bearing on the willingness of a
businessman to support the financing costs of
inventories on hand, and the obligation im-
plied in those on order. I hinted at the argu-
ment in Chapter 2: retained profits constitute
a source of funds and some portions of these
funds must be kept liquid against the demise
of good times. Would not investment in in-
ventories provide this liquidity, whereas in-
vestment in fixed capital would not? If so,
the actual opportunity cost of financing the
additional stock is not the standard earnings
rate that all investment, including investment
in inventories, is likely to be required to meet;
this figure may be 15 to 25 per cent in the
heavy industries. Instead, it is the opportunity
cost of liquid funds, as set by the earnings
rate of assets such as commercial paper or
government bonds. Management rules do not
discuss such matters, but it may nevertheless
get around that the front office is willing to
overlook inventory investment which is high
by the usual standards.
DEPARTMENT STORES
For department stores, there is little perti-
nent information on market conditions with
which to compare the ratio of outstanding or-
ders to sales. Nevertheless, Chart 11 displays
some relevant data and Table 36 gives match-
ing measurements.
For one thing, the ratio has a persistent
lead relative to the business cycle or subcycle
chronology. At peaks it averages nine months;
at troughs three, and four of the six trough
comparisons are leads of between two and four
months (Table 36, line 2). Thus the depart-
ment store ratio moves earlier than for the
durable goods industry (line 8) and very sys-
tematically so. This may reflect the tendency
for consumer buying to move early in the post-
war years. But there is, of course, no reason
why changes in market expectations, if indeed
thisis what the ratios reflect, should have
identical patterns in markets as diverse as
those for materials for durable goods indus-
tries on the one hand and for finished goods
sold by department stores on the other. In
any event, there are interesting similarities
and differencesbetweentheoutstandings-
sales ratio for the two sets of enterprises.
Of particular interest is what they suggest
about the periods of thrust that we have ob-
served in other contexts. For durable goods,
termination of these thrusts marks the begin-
ning' of a downturn that continues through-
out the rest of expansion. For department
stores a relatively level period (1959) or a
fall followed by a subsequent rise (1947 and
1951) may follow after the first strong upward
rise at the start of cyclical expansion. The
extra movements correspond to those found
in many economic series in 1947 and after
the Korean boom. It is interesting, inciden-
tally, that the business expansion starting in
early 1961 was accompanied by increases in
the number of months' sales covered by out-
standing orders for department stores; whereas
fordurables,the increase in outstandings
(which, note, did take place at exactly the
same time—December 1960) was less than pro-
portional to the rise in sales, so that the ratio
continued to fall off.
Table 37 develops further characteristics of
the ratios at the time of rapid expansion. If,
for the sake of argument, we read the strong
rises in outstandings-sales or shipment ratios
as an indicator of increasing tensions in the
relevant materials markets, the figures picture10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS 191
CHART 11
Ratio of Outstanding Orders to Sales of Department Stores,
Note: Shaded areas represent business contractions. Specific cycle turns are marked by dots,
additional minor turns by triangles.
aIndexof spot prices of nine semidurable industrial commodities.
bDiffusionIndex, Chicago Purchasing Agents Association.
cFive-monthcentered average of month-to-month change.
Compared with Selected Series, 1946—63
Index (1947-49r100)192 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 36




P T P T P T P TP T P T
Line Series0 (1/47)(7/47)11/4810/49(2/51) (6/52) 7/538/547/574/585/602/61
Specific Series:Ratio of Outstanding Orders to Sales
IBusiness cycles —4 —10 —3—19 +1 +2 —3
2Subcycles —8 .za —4 —6 —9 —10 —3—19 +1 +2 —3
3Spot prices,
semidurables —10 —2 +1 +2 —6 —10 —12 —3 +1 0+12
4Level of vendor
performance, —5 —2 —8 —4 0 3 +7 —8
5Average term of
purchase orders +1 0 —5 +1+3+2 +7_4
6D. I. vendor
performance' 0 0 +3 —1 —6 +2 +5 +2+5 +9 +8
7Change stocks
dept. stores —1 0 0 0 —2 0 —2 +6 0 +3 +4 —1
8R: Materials
outstanding to
shipments, dur. -3 -11 -2 —7 —7 —8
Specific Series: Change in Stocks
9Spot prices,
semidurables —10 —2 +1 +2 —4 —10 —10 9 +1_3 +5 n
10Level of vendor
performance, —5 —2 —6 —10 0 —6 +3 7
11Average term of
purchase orders,+1 0 —3 —5+3-1 +3 —3
12D. I. vendor
performance' 0 0 +3 +1 —6 +4 —1 +2+2 +5 +9

















Line SeriesC —+ 0P TAll 12/61 PT Wt'd
SpecificSeries:Ratio of Outstanding Ordersto Sates
1Business cycles 620—10.5—3.0.3.55.51.25.13.4 3,4 65
2Subcycles 1020 —9.0—3.0—5.04.72.04.53.3 5 71
3Spot prices,
semidurables 641 —2.5—1.7—1.77.03.15.25.2 —2, —3 6,4h
4Level of vendor
performance, 611 —2.5—3.5—3.55.01.83.43..4 —3, —4 75
5Average term of
purchase orders, 251÷2.0÷0.5+1.33.51.82.72.6, +1 79
6D. I. vendor
performance' 272+1.7+4.0+2.32.53.53.23.0 +2 81
7Change stocks
dept. stores 435 —0.50 0 1.51.71.61.6 0 90
8R: materials
outstanding to
shipments, dur. 600 —8.7—4.0—7.01.52.02.31.8 7 79
Specific Series: Change in Stocks
9Spot prices,
semidurables 740 —1.5—4.7—3.05.24.1.4.54.7 3 h66
10Level of vendor
performance, 611 —2.5—6.5—5.53.52.23.12.9 —5,—fl 75
11Average term of
purchase orders, 431+2.0—2.0—0.52.01.82..41.9 0,—i 79
12D. I. vendor
performance1 272+2.3+1.0+1.71.63.52.72.7 +2 8,4
For notes a through g, see Table 35.
prices of semidurables were compared with each of the specific series for the time period
1/47—12/61.
1D. I. signifies diffusion index. For description see text footnote 6, above.194 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 37
Comparison of Timing and Duration for Periods of Thrust in Outstandings-














Trougha Endof Thrustb Trougha End of Thrustb
(1) (2)
5/47 12/47 unmatched 7 ——
6/49 8/50 +3 +11 12 22
9/51 9/52 unmatched 12 —
5/54 12/55 +2 +7 19 24
5/58 5/59 +7 +6 12 11
11/60 5/62 unmatched —— 18 ——
Average +4.0 +8.0 13.3 19.0
Note: Ratio of outstanding orders to sales for department stores and ratio of outstanding
materials orders to shipments for all durable goods manufacturers.
aTroughs are the specific cycle or subcycle trough dates.
bThe termination date for department stores is the point at which the first continuous rise
ceases or reverses; this is the date marked as the specific cycle or subcycle peak except for
the last two movements. For durables it is in each case the specific cycle peak date.
a shingled overlay in the two markets. Sup-
pliers of department stores feel the start of
extension first—four months earlier on the av-
erage. (The last line shows that troughs in
durables lag those in department stores by four
months on the average.) But for suppliers of
durable goods manufacturers extension per-
sists longer (the peaks of the thrusts are eight
months later on the average than those of
department stores). Suppliers of department
stores experience it more often—several epi-
sodes are unmatched. But the rises after major
cyclical troughs, the movements shared by the
two industries, can be of longer total duration
in the durable goods than in the consumer
supply fields (compare columns 3 and 4). It
is interesting in this connection to remember
that the percentage amplitude of rise during
their expansion phases was virtually the same
for the two ratios—peak standings on the
average were 152 per cent of trough standings
for durables and 144 per cent for department
stores. But of course, since the number of
months' supply on order was far larger for
durables, the absolute increase, in terms of
weeks' supply, was also larger—over twice the
size.13 This is probably the more significant
fact from the point of view of the market de-
velopments that are implied.
What the ratio suggests about market exten-
sion for department stores ought to be com-
pared with information about the appropriate
markets themselves, but unfortunately none
seems readily available. A sensitive price index
does not apply directly to finished consumer
goods, but might have some indirect value as
a reflection of tensions in those markets. The
13SeeTables 7 and 16. The average week's supply
on order for durable goods industries at troughs and
peaks respectively was 8.2 and 12.5, an increase of 4.3
weeks during expansion. For department stores, the
corresponding figures were 4.0, 5.7, and 1.7.10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS 195
top line in Chart 11 is spot-market prices for
nondurable industrial commodities, which, of
course, are a poor representation of even the
raw materials used in department store mer-
chandise.14 Perhaps all that can be said of
this series is that it resembles retailers' advance
buying more than would the metals price in-
dex of the previous chart. Nevertheless, though
all turns are matched, the timing is very ir-
regular and a very low percentage of months
are in like phase (Table 36, line 3).
Firms reporting to the Chicago Purchasing
Agents are chiefly manufacturers of durable
goods. Nevertheless comparisons with the de-
partment store data are of interest. Indeed,
line 4 of Table 36 shows that outstanding
orders of department stores lead the level of
vendor performance as the other timing figures
imply, but correspondence is low. With the
average term of purchase orders (line 5), its
correspondence is a bit better, allowing for a
lag of one month. But a somewhat closer as-
sociation is evident with respect to the infor-
mation that records not the level of vendor
performance but its rate of change—the per-
centage of agents reporting that vendors' de-
liveriesaredeteriorating. This series,like
virtually allfirst difference series, leads the
levelofperformance.Eleventurnsare
matched and 81 per cent of months are in
like phase after allowing for a two-month lag
of the department store ratio. In Chart 11
(compare curves 2 and 3) the eye seems to
support this measure of parallelism.
In view of the central need to have items
on hand when customers may want them, part
of retailers' defense against tightening markets
is likely to be an effort to get goods delivered
at once. The very high degree of correspond-
ence (90 per cent of months are in like phase
on a synchronous basis) of the outstandings
ratio and the rate of change in stocks on hand,
curve 4 of the chart (Table 36, line 7), could
reflect this type of influence. It might also be
reflected in the close association of inventory
14Thecommodities includedare burlap,cotton,
hides, print cloth, rubber, tallow, wool tops, rosin.
investment with the rate of deterioration or
improvement in vendor performance a month
or so earlier (line 12). Eighty-four per cent
of months are in like phase; eleven turns are
matched, six of which are within two months
of one another. At peaks the average devia-
tion is only 1.6 months for the five compari-
sons.
In general there is little of consequence to
go on, but the scraps that are available cer-
tainly do not deny the presence of market-
directed considerations in retailers' buying.
Also, market extension, as defined by the out-
standings-sales ratio, occurs more often and
typically a bit earlier than in the durable goods
market. It has an exceedingly close counter-
part in rates of change in stocks on hand.
Rates of Change in Outstandings
Rates of change are capable of enriching
the meager infonnation previously reviewed.
For one thing, there are some additional series
that can be introduced in this form. For an-
other, comparisons of rates of change further
specifyinformationaboutcorrespondence
yielded by data proper. Finally, and most im-
portant, it is possible that part of the process
whereby a buying wave rises and falls operates
through the impact of rates of change on the
sensory apparatus of the market. Also, if ad-
justment to change in buying is sticky, high
rates of change may occasion more response
than low ones, other things the same; this line
of thought finds application in the last chap-
ter.
Once again, the most likely spot at which
to see the reaction of buying to market con-
ditions is in outstandings and rates of change
in outstandings are particularly sensitive to
market conditions. If more and more buyers
fear that more suppliers will deliver more
slowly or raise prices in one form or another,
they will tend to place their orders for more
goods farther ahead. In the aggregate buying
is then likely to increase at an increasing rate.
In examining changes in outstandings it is196 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
just as well to include the response to changes
in sales rather than to try to remove it by
using ratios. It is clear by now that the sales
influence is only one part of a complex pic-
ture, yet, since it may interact with the rest
(and the next chapter shows that it does),
it is better to include it than to take it out
along with perhaps some other interaction
effect.
Chart 12 displays an impressive parallelism
between the rate at which outstanding orders
for materials increase or decrease and the
number of vendors that are reported to be
making slower or faster deliveries. The two
series share all the same movements and even
the relative severity of each seems quite simi-
lar. The measures in Table 38, line 1, indicate
that 82 per cent of the months are in like
phase on a synchronous basis. There are
eleven matched terms, eight of which are
within two months of one another. Rates of
change then support the other evidence sug-
gesting that market extension takesplace
partly because suppliers require a longer time
to make deliveries on at least some essential
materials. However, the indication that this
aspect tended to lead, which seemed implicit
in the lead of the cumulative vendor perform-
ance index relative to the outstandings-ship-
ments ratio, is weakened or rather qualified
by the fact that, converted to rates of change,
the association is not clearly different from
synchronous. This is doubtless just another in-
stance of how two phenomena can accelerate
or decelerate at the same time, although the
one does not actually reverse as swiftly as the
other.
The association of outstandings and metals
prices is deteriorated by differencing. This is
caused at least in part by technical character-
istics of the price series which may or may
not have economic meaning: the data proper
are unusually triangular in shape; therefore
their first differences do not have the usual
wavelike pattern, and selection of peaks and
troughs is difficult and perhaps not meaning-
ful. However, on the average, changes in out-
standings are about synchronous with changes
in prices. Thus, for whatever it is worth, these
figures do not contradict the observation based
on the data proper that timing association
was not consistent with a causal link running
from actual prices to expected prices to mar-
ket expansion or contraction. This link would
imply that prices lead because it is the rates
of change in price and outstandings proper
which would tend to be synchronous (or here
second differences in prices and first differ-
ences in outstandings). The logic of this as-
sociation was discussed at the start of the chap-
ter.
The presence or absence of a backlog of
sales orders can affect the risk cost of advance
purchase of the materials required for the fab-
rication of the orders. Indeed, if a firm must
write orders for future delivery at a predeter-
mined price, it may be risky not to fix mate-
rials price (by immediate purchase) at the
cost figured into the sales contract. Is there
evidence that "backorders" affect the volumes
of materials buying? The question may be
examined by means of a series collected by
thePurchasing Agents. Companies report
whether the backlogs of the products the com-
pany sells are increasing or decreasing. This
information for the same companies can be
compared with the average term of purchase
orders, the closest that the Purchasing Agents
data come to changes in outstanding orders
formaterials.Eighty-six per centofthe
months are in like phase (Table 38, line 8);
of the eleven matched terms, seven are within
two months of one another. However, it is in-
teresting to find that changes in sales backlogs
lag rather than lead changes in the average
term of outstanding orders for materials (there
is only one lead);the average lag is two
months.
Further and somewhat conflicting evidence
on the impact of unfilled sales orders of the
machinery and transportation equipment in-
dustries with those of the materials-producing
industries—hypothetically the outstanding ma-
terials orders of the first group (though with10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS
CHART 12
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TABLE 38
Timing: Changes in Outstanding Materials Orders and Selected Market Data,





P T P T P T P T P T P T
Line Series0 1947[9471948[94919511952195319541957195819601961
Specific Series: Change in Outstanding Orders, Materials
1D. I. vendor
performance 0 0 +2 +2 +5 —2 —1 —1 —8 0 —9 +1
2Changeaverage
term of purchase
orders 0 +2 —3 +2 +7 —2 —2 +3 —4+11 —2 +2
3Change spot
prices,metals 0 —2 --7 +1 +7 +8 +6 +5 —8 +9 1 7
.4Spot prices,
metals 0 +8 —10 —10 +1 —3 —14 —4 —10 —8
5Change unfilled
orders, final
product +2 —1 +1 -9 +4 —4 —8
6D. I. backlog
sales orders 0 0 —7 0 +6 —4 —4 0 —2 0 —2 —8
7Corporate
profits 0 —9 0 +3 _7' 0 —9 —5 —4 —10
Specific Series:Change in AverageTermofPurchase Orders
8D. I. backlog
sales orders 0 —2 —4 —2 —1 —2 —2 —3 +2 —11 0 —10
Specific Series:D. 1. Vendor Performance
9D. I. backlog
sales orders 0 0 —9 —2 +1 —2 —3 +1 +6 0 +7 —9
10D. I. production _11r+2 —1 ±4 +3 0 —6 0 —8+10
SpecificSeries:Ratio Materials Outstanding to Shipments
11Change unfilled
orders, final
product 0 0 +6 +4 0 0 +9 +8+16 +6
SpecificSeries:Average Term of Purchase Orders
12Change unfilled
orders, final
product —2 ® +3 —2 0 0 +6 —2 +7 +7 +3
13D. I. backlog
salesorders ® ÷1 +5 +5 +5 +3 +9 -1-3
SpecificSeries:D. I. Backlog Sales Orders
14Change unfilled
orders, final
product +2 —7 +1 —7 +4 —2 0





















Specific Series: Change in Outstanding Orders, Materials
1D. I. vendor
performanceh 542 —2.3 0 —0.35.11.02.82.8 0,—i 82
2Change average
term of purchase
orders 56 0 —2.3+2.0+0.72.52.33.62.4 0,+2 79
3Change spot
prices,metalsi 56 0 —0.7+3.0 +1.75.65.05.55.3 +1 68
4Spot prices,
72 0—10.0—5.0 —7.33.86.65.25.3 —8 77
5Change unfilled
orders, final
product 430 —4.7+1.5—1.32.93.24.03.1 —1,0 77
6D. I. backlog
sales orders1' 614 —2.7 0 —1.32.72.02.92.5 1,2 83
7Corporate
profits 712 —7.3—4.0 —6.04.13.64.03.9 77
Specific Series: Change in Average Term of Purchase Orders
8D. I. backlog
h salesorders 911 —1.0—2.5 —2.01.83.02.52.4 —2 86
Specific Series: D. I. Vendor Performanceh
9D. I. backlog
sales orders1' 542 +1.3—1.0 —0.75.12.33.73.6 0 79
10D. I. 442 —5.0+2.00 4.42.84.53.6 0 70
Specific Series:Ratio Materials Outstanding to Shipments
11Change unfilled
orders,final
product 060 +6.0+10.3+7.01.33.82.82.6 +6,+7,+8 84
Specific Series:Average Term of Purchase Orders
12Change unfilled
orders, final
product 35 0 —2.0+4.5 +3.02.21.83.22.0 +3 89
13D. I. backlog
sales 0 70 +6.3+3.0+4.31.81.01.81.3 82
SpecificSeries: D. 1. Backlog Sales Ordersh
14Change unfilled
orders,final
product 331 —5.3+1.5 —0.32.21.23.3 0, —1 76200 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
Notes to Table 38
NOTE:For notes a, d, e, 1, see Table 35.
bchronologydates are years when business
cycle turns occur. They indicate the sequence
and approximate time when the specific turns
occur for which timing comparisons are given.
CRefeeneseriesaretheseries whose
specific cycles plus minor cycles constitute
serious impurities previously discussed). We
have already noted that the data proper are
poorly associated. Nor do the rates of change
display an interesting confluence. Table 38,
line 5, shows 77 per cent of the months in
like phase on a synchronous basis: only seven
turns are matched, and leads and lags are
equally common. In Chart 6, where the two
series were plotted, we saw that changes in
backlogs do not have extra movements in 1947
and 1952; beginning in 1959 they had virtually
no movements at all. This last characteristic
brings to mind the ratio of outstanding ma-
terials orders to shipments, and further ex-
amination does indeed suggest other similari-
ties. The rate at which back orders for final
products built up or declined rose or fell on
the average at least six months or more before
the matched fluctuations in the ratio. Allowing
for this lag, 84 per cent of the months were
in like phase (Table 38, line 11).
All in all, the evidence bearing on the im-
pact of backlogs of sales orders on materials
buying is frustrating. For one thing the CPA
data, which are highly pertinent, since they
concern sales and purchase orders for the same
companies, show close correspondence in, in
effect, rates of change in the two sorts of un-
filled orders; those for materials moved a bit
sooner. The census data show an association
between the level of purchase orders outstand-
ing, expressed in terms of months of sales and
the rate of change in sales orders of the heavy
industries a good half a year earlier. The dif-
ference may conceivably be the result of the
difference in the sorts of firms covered in the
two sets of information; if so, this has some
the reference dates with which matching cycles
in the specific series are compared.
h T . . . i.'.i. signifiesDiffusion Index
ichangeinand levelof spot prices of
metals were compared with the change in out-
standing orders materials for the time period
1/49—12/6 1.
economic meaning. But the possibility cannot
be ruled out that difference results from tech-
nical characteristics of the CPA data.15
But I do not want to overemphasize the
ambiguities of the evidence. The predominant
impression is that of similarity. The empirical
materials certainly are not inconsistent with
the notion that a manufacturer is more likely
to buy more materials farther ahead than
usual at a time when backlogs for his own
product are large, or that he is likely to return
to a hand-to-mouth position when his cus-
tomers are getting prompt deliveries.
15 Concerning the problem of composition of the two
sets of data, the CPA companies that report backlogs
of sales orders are certainly not all members of the
machinery and transportation equipment industries.
Indeed, the proportion that are in some intermediate
type of manufacture may well be large. For these,
sales orders would be covered only as materials orders
in the census data. This explanation seems consistent
with the fact that when the two sets of statistics on
change inunfilledsales ordersare compared, the
census series lags the other at the three peaks that
can be matched (the average is five months) and leads
slightlyat the three troughs. This suggestsa very
long term for backlogs of orders in the heavy industries
at peaks in business, and certainly this is sensible.
Concerning the problem of the technical character
of the indexes, the CPA data for both sales and pur-
chase orders are diffusion indexes of answers which
themselves have no quantitative dimensions, but only
a direction of change. It is possible that the amount
of change tends to have a different pattern for sales
and purchase orders. The census data are of course
first differences of unfilled orders proper, which take
the quantitative aspects of change into account.
A second possible technical basis for the high order
of similarities for the CPA reports on sales and pur.
chase orders outstanding could simply be that the
same man, the purchasing agent, no doubt makes both
reports. His judgment about what is happening to
backlogs of sales orders may be colored by what he
feels it necessary to do about buying—his own bailiwick.10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS 201
CAPA CITY LIMITATIONS
The Concept
All that has been learned about change
in ownership of materials suggests that both
buyer and seller participate in causing waves
of market extension and contraction. This is
dictated, in part, simply by the compound
character of the phenomenon. It is dictated
also by the fact that the cost of market ex-
tension is for the buyer an alternative to other
ways of coping with the same problem; for
the seller, rationing supply by selecting those
customers who are willing to wait is an alter-
native to selecting those customers who are
willing to pay a higher price.
However, itis perhaps also true that the
entire phenomenon could be accounted for
almost entirely in terms of delays in deliveries
announced by suppliers, at times when the
market could support them. This is an ex-
treme statement and its truth or falsity is not
important. A less extreme statement is clearly
true: seller-instigated delays in delivery can
be an important cause of market extension.
How could a time series suggest the presence
of this influence?
At first thought it might seem that the an-
swer is simple—by a noteworthy parallelism
between an index of percentage of capacity
utilized and one depicting market extension.
But a moment's thought disturbs the simplic-
ity. Why should an increase in utilization
from, say, 50 to 60 per cent have the same
impact as an increase from 90 to 100 per
cent? A more reasonable supposition may be
that the increase from 50 to 60 per cent has
no impact at all. This line of thought implies
that a hypothetical perfect correspondence be-
tween time series on capacity utilization and
materials outstanding could be something
other than parallelism: extension might not
start until utilization reached some minimum
level. The association once underway might
not be linear; rates of change might also be
relevant.
A further difficulty concerns the degree to
which capacity ceilings result from, on the
one hand, growth infinal demand, plus
change in the stocks necessary to service it
efficiently or, on the other hand, from growth
of intermediate demand associated with the
interplay between expectations and other
short-term shifts in costs as visualized by buyers
as well as sellers. Insofar as the first factors
operate alone, capacity ceilings could be a
chief cause of buying waves. Insofar as the
second are also involved, they are at most
only one of other contributing causes.
Obviously, then, itis not easy to specify
precisely how evidence can inform on process.
But in view of the character of the evidence,
there is no reason to worry about the refine-
ments. What, then, do the time series show?
They show, in the first place, that they are
most uncooperative. The basic difficulty is that
the active element in estimates of percentage
of capacity utilized is utilization. Utilization,
ordinarily registered by an index of produc-
tion, reflects the total level of demand whether
for final sales or intermediate requirements
of any sort. There is,therefore, no way to
cleanse the picture of capacity limitations
which are themselves the result of expected
capacity limitations. The difficulty is accentu-
ated by the fact that the data are annual.
An interpolation for shorter time intervals
virtually excludes any influence other than
simply the current level of production.
The Data
Chart 13 presents the dilemma. The figures
are those compiled by the Federal Reserve
Board for the metals segment of "major ma-
terials." Capacity is based on engineering es-202 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
CHART 13















timates.16 The figures for 1962—64 exclude
steel ingot capacity, reports on which were
discontinued by the industry. All of the peaks
in percentage of capacity utilized occurred in
the same year as those of output. Thus the
utilization series merely changes the trend of
the output series from a rising slope to a level
or declining slope (whether level or declining
would depend on what inclusion of data for
steel ingot capacity would do to the index).
A second group of information on plant
utilizationis reported by corporate officials
in response to the McGraw-Hill Survey. It
provides the basis for estimates of capacity
16 The data are unpublished and I am indebted to
Frank de Leeuw for making them available.
utilized in the durable materials industries,
as they have been defined in this study, for
1954—62. After 1962 the steel reports are not
available; accordingly, the index with iron
and steel omitted is also shown.17
The McGraw-Hill materials industries in-
dex differs from the Federal Reserve Board
major metals materials in severalrespects.
For one thing, the former is dated December
of each year and the latter covers the full
year. For another thing, the coverage of the
figuresis,asIhavedescribed,different.
'7 The capacity estimates are published for the two-
digit industries covered in our analysis for the durable
goods materials group. I have combined them, using
output weights.
1947 '50 '52 '54 '56 '58 '60 '62 '64
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Division of Research and Statistics.CHART 14
Notes: Order term is the Chicago Purchasing Agents Association Series on the average de-
livery term for purchase orders for major materials previously shown on a monthly basis. Curve
1 gives annual averages; curve 5 gives December figures.
Outstandings-shipment ratiois based on the Commerce data for durable goods materials
manufacturers, previously shown on a monthly basis. Curve 2 gives annual averages; curve 6
gives December figures.
Utilization rate, metals materials. Curve 3 is FRB data as in Chart 13, curves 4A and 4B are
McGraw-Hill data (see text).
Utilization rate, final products industries (curve 7), based on McGraw-Hill data (see text).
Ratio, curve 8, is curve 4A divided by curve 7.
Months
2.4
Capacity Utilization Rates Compared with Outstanding
Orders and Order Terms, 1947—64
1947 '50 '52 '54 '56 '58 '60 '62 '64204 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
Chart 14 shows both series, and there is no
way of judging whether the difference in their
course is due to conflict or to the technical
differences. In any event, the two estimates
of capacity utilized each drawn with a heavy
line in the chart, may be compared with eco-
nomic data which might be causally related.
I choose outstanding orders and vendor per-
formance, and they are shown above as annual
averages (compare with curve 3) and below
as December figures (compare with curves 4A
and 4B).
Doubtless the annual figures are not ade-
quate to display the subtleties of timing as-
sociation. Nevertheless the troughs in out-
standings seem to synchronize rather than lag,
as they would if utilization rates did not in-
fluence buying until they had exceeded some
trigger level. The dip in plant utilization in
1952 and its failure to peak in 1959 is no
doubt associated with the long strikes in
those years. Perhaps the most damaging as-
pect of the association is the very modest rise
in outstandings in response to the sharp in-
crease in capacity utilization in 1955 and
1956.
Rather more interesting is the visual cor-
respondence with the average term of pur-
chase orders (top or fifth curve), which in-
corporates the answers of purchasing agents
to the question, "How far ahead must you
buy in order to have principal materials on
hand when needed?" Again, the low utiliza-
tion rates in 1952 and 1959, doubtless asso-
ciated with the strikes, do not have a cor-
responding tendency to improve vendor per-
formance (cause the curve to fall). Allowing
for this, there appears to be a general similar-
ity in the direction and orders of magnitude
of the movement in the two series—curves 1
and 3, or 5 and 4. And certainly, if activity
in a plant starts to press on available capacity,
customers are likely to find that they have
to order farther ahead in order to have the
product on time. Of all the factors influenc-
ing ownership that have been examined, the
average order term is the one that should
most exactly transmit the impact of tight or
slack supply conditions.
Of course, the figures say nothing about the
sort of process that is involved in the deterio-
rating performance of vendors—whether, for
example, it is associated with pressure from
final demand or from a buildup in inter-
mediate demand. One fragile piece of evi-
dence on this point is afforded by a second
segment of the McGraw-Hill data—an index
covering the industries in our final products
group (curve 7, Chart 14).18 Though the av-
erage utilization rate in these industriesis
about the same as for the materials group,
it fluctuates substantially less (compare curves
7 and 4A). The bottom curve, the ratio of
the utilization rate of materials to that of
final products, replicates much of the move-
ment of its numerator. For whatever the fig-
ures are worth, they argue that something
which happens as demand moves to earlier
stages exacerbates variations in planned utili-
zation.
However the basic difficulty sketched at the
start of the chapter remains: it is hard to say
how parallelism in market extension, or even
in the speed with which vendors make de-
liveries, and capacity limitations should be in-
terpreted. What is the meaning of the associa-
tion which the statistics seem mildly to dis-
play? For one thing thereisa question
whether the timing is really appropriate as
evidence of association. Why should order
terms start to extend just when utilization
rates firststart to increase? At such times,
there should be plenty of capacity to meet
the increased demand; an analogous argu-
ment speaks for lags at peaks also. In any
event, even if the association did have causal
implications,thereis no indication asto
18Capacityutilized in the following industries was
combined using Federal Reserve Board production
weights:machinery,electricmachinery,autos and
trucks and parts (except for December 1956), trans-
portation equipment and aerospace. The auto group
was not included in 1956 and therefore, as the dashed
line in the chart indicates, the data for 1956—57 are
not entirely comparable with the other years.10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS 205
whether it resulted from a quasi-independent
high level of utilization, from expectations
of shortages and further actions which could
be generated in the intermediate industries
group, or from the two types of influence
in combination. Perhaps all that can be safely
said is that high utilization rates appear to
have characterized some of the periods in
the past when other signs of market exten-
sion were numerous and strong.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
The question with which the chapter started—
What are some of the factors other than
sales that influence ownership?—has been an-
swered largely in terms of a change in con-
ditions in the market in which materials are
bought, and in factors that influence the cost
of taking these changes into account. Exclu-
sion of other potential influences was forced
by the absence of information on them. Even
for the market-oriented group, the data permit
no more than a highly impressionistic de-
scription. However, the time series that have
been examined generally support the notion
based on considerations of the functions that
stocks serve in a business enterprise.
The following observations summarize the
findings:
1. There does seem to appear in the aggre-
gate data evidence that expectations about
market conditionschange verymaterially
from time to time. (a) They undergo cyclical
fluctuations which reach their high points
some months prior to those in general busi-
ness.(b) Their periods of most rapid rise
occur quite early in expansion, participating
very strongly in the phenomenon that I have
called thefirstthrust of expansion.(c) A
number of the series that reflect market con-
ditions appear to rise very steadily during
these periods and then reverse abruptly with-
out the usual interval of retardation.
The logic of business problems prescribes
that a number of factors are likely to par-
ticipate in market-oriented fluctuation. The
tables and charts that have been reviewed
provide evidence that a number of these hap-
penings are characterized by broadly similar
patterns of change: backlogs of sales orders
may accelerate or profits rise, thereby chang-
ing the costs associated with advance buying;
suppliers may demand a longer delivery per-
iod, or prices may be expected to rise, thereby
changing conditions or expectations concern-
ing conditions in the materials market.
But though these influences are often likely
to change together and consequently to act
on materials procurement with united force,
their patterns are far from identical. Itis
therefore instructive, by way of summary, to
point to such differences in behavior as ap-
pear with sufficient persistence to seem po-
tentially meaningful. The behavior will then
be linked with its meaning as suggested by
the analysis of market phenomena with which
this chapter started.
Differencesareexhibitedin Table39.
There, all of the evidence bearing on each
factor that may influence market conditions
or expectations is compared with the evidence
concerning levelsof market positions and
their rates of change.
2. Unfilled sales orders tend to lag outstand-
ing orders for materials (lines1to 6). De-
fined in terms of rates of change, they lag
by short intervals, particularly at peaks (sec-
tion B). Defined in terms of levels of out-
standings, the lag is clearer and somewhat
longer, especially so at troughs (section A).
The association shown inthe purchasing
agents' reports is quite close when rates of
change are compared; however, as explained
earlier, technical aspects of the data may over-
state similarities. For the book-value informa-
tion, confluence is low except when the rate
of change in backlogs is compared with the
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Notes to Table 39
*!The series covered are the ones already
familiar to the reader. However to aid in iden-
tifying them, those for which the source is the
Census data for durable goods manufacturers
are and those for which the source is
the Purchasing Agents Association of Chicago
are marked!.
aThe period that is covered is 7/46 to 12/6 1;
exception, see note c.
half a year later (Table 38, line 11). In gen-
eral the picture is consistent with the notion
that the presence of order backlogs tends,
other things the same, to reduce the risk-cost
of advance-materials ordering. However, the
less than regular association, and the fact that
extension of materials tends to precede that
offinishedproducts,indicatesthatother
things are by no means the same. For one
thing, we see that at least the backlog of sales
orders needs to cease declining (or building
up) at an increasing rate some months before
procurement officers begin to extend (or con-
tract) their orders outstanding. For retailers,
since all sales tend to be for immediate de-
livery, the influence is entirely absent.
3. Profits, thought of as a source of funds,
could also affect the costs that bear on pro-
curement policy. Profits exhibit an impressive
association with outstandings expressed in
terms of months of sales about a half a year
later. Eighty-nine per cent of months are in
like phase. How can this association be ex-
plained? One possibility is that there is no
direct causal link; instead we see merely par-
allelism in two sensitive representations of
many things affecting sales and purchases. But
there is a possibility that the confluence re-
flects a change in the opportunity cost of
capitalforfirmsthat finance inventories
largely with internal funds. The argument
runs as follows: when internal funds are tem-
porarily plentiful, businessmen are willing to
invest the excess over normal supply of funds
in assets that are relatively liquid(such as
inventoriesorshort-termfinancialobliga.
bNumber of months whereby market factor
(Col. 2) lead (—)orlag (+), outstandings (Col.
1).
cRefers to the period 1/49—12/61. The tim-
ing for the rate of change in prices compared
with the level of outstandings was: P, —12; T,
—13; All, —12; 73 per cent of months in phase
allowing for 12 or 13 month lead.
tions), but are unwilling to invest them in
assets that will tie up the funds during times
of possible future need. Thus the true oppor-
tunity cost of funds for inventories shifts
from that of basic earning rates in the busi-
ness to that of interest on liquid assets such
as bonds or the like. As far as I know, the
possibility of discontinuities of this sort has
not been studied. It should be. For if there
is anything to my argument, it would under-
score the immunity possessed by some large
firms,which financestocks from internal
funds, to efforts to restrict quasi-speculative
inventory buying through monetary policy.
For these firms, the argument would imply,
not only would the restrictive monetary policy
have little direct impact via a higher interest
charge, but costs of funds for holding stocks
could in effect actually be lower rather than
higher (due to the shift in the appropriate
opportunity cost)atjustthetimes when
credit stringency is developing.
4. Of the factors that bear on conditions
in materials markets, sensitive prices are an
obvious candidate. Prices tend to lead out-
standings whether compared for department
stores (Table 36,line3)or for durables,
whether as data proper or as rates of change
(Table 39, lines 5 and 6). This isclearly
not in accord with the causal explanation
that moves from the actual rate of change
inprices,throughtheexpectedrateof
change in prices, to the desired level of own-
ership. The logic implies synchronous 'associa-
tion between the rate of change in prices and
the level of ownership. Instead, changes in208 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
prices lead the level of ownership by about
a year (Table 39, note c). The last chapter
describes what a relationship ofthissort
might imply.
5. The time series also supply evidence con-
cerning what earlier in this chapter I called
the analytic components of increase or de-
creasein materials outstanding. The first
component,outstandingsassociatedwith
change in sales and sales-linked stocks, I have
tried to remove by using ratios or first dif-
ferences. But evidence on the others—chang-
Ing delivery periods in the several categories
(numbers 3 and 4), and changing weights
in total outstandings of deliveries in each
category (number 2)—is afforded by the body
of data collected by purchasing agents con-
cerning what they and their suppliers do—
actions that affect these matters of delivery
terms and their relative weights. This en-
tirelyindependentsourceofinformation
shows noteworthy correspondence to the level
and rates of change in the book value of out-
standing orders of materials.
The speed with which vendors offerto
supply major materials ("vendor perform-
ance") accelerates or decelerates at much the
same time as total orders outstanding (Table
39, line 8). Though there are minor differ-
ences, the same statement applies to rates of
change in the average term of purchase or-
ders (line 10). The first series is confined to
changes indelivery periods—analytic com-
ponent number 3; the second includes chang-
ing relative weights of advance and "at once"
deliveries, component number 2.
The data proper have a different though
quite systematic association (lines 9 and 11).
The average term of purchase orders starts to
decline and vendor performance starts to im-
prove several months before the total volume
ofoutstandings(expressedinmonthsof
sales) turns down; a like remark, toned down,
applies to the trough comparison. The lag in
outstandings may reflect, among other things,
the tendency for orders bearing long delivery
terms to remain outstanding after fewer new
orders of these terms are currently being
written. In this sense, the explanation is anal-
ogous to that of the long lead of outstandings
relative to stocks that was suggested earlier.
6. For department stores, such evidence of
parallelism as the data afford does not justify
an effort to distinguish the particulars of fac-
tors bearing on outstandings. Clearly, relevant
data on market conditions are lacking. Never-
theless, in view of these deficiencies, there
does seem to be an association worth noting
between the level of outstandings expressed
in terms of months' sales and the rate at
which vendor performance was improving or
deteriorating two months earlier. Eighty-one
per cent of months were in phase (Table 36,
line6). The rate of change in stock also
showed a close relation to this series with a
two months' lag—84 per cent of the months
were in phase (line 12). As we shall see in
the next chapter, it is quite possible that the
seasonal and other problems of retail stores
mean that levels of outstandings and rates of
change in stocks on hand reflect rates of
change in market conditions.
7. These various particulars of timing as-
sociation are interesting and bear on the dy-
namics of the process of inventory fluctua-
tion. Individually, the bits of evidence are
frail. Collectively, they seem to make a more
reliable assertion: the rates of change in each
of the variables that constitute market condi-
tions tend to move, broadly speaking, within
a few months of one another. Note the simi-
larity of timing for all items in the second
set of columns (section B), in which the rate
of change in each market factor is compared
with the rate of change in outstandings. This
fact seems to underscore the interrelatedness
of the compound phenomenon of fluctuation
in ownership. Whether individual business-
men tend to change their market positions
primarily because they expect prices to rise,
deliveries to tighten, or other costs to change,
they will all tend to do the same thing at
the same time.
8. Is it possible to separate, at least collec-10. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: MARKET CONDITIONS 209
lively, the group of factors affecting inter-
mediate demand from thoseaffectingthe
supply side of materials purchasing? A nega-
tive reply was developed in the last section
of the chapter. Though there was evidence of
some parallelism between the level of capacity
utilization and the average term for which
the niaterials remained outstanding, the fact
of parallelism has an unclear causal interpre-
tation. Certainly some of the more extreme
episodes of advance buying occurred when
utilization rates were high, but the waves seem
to start and stop before the capacity thesis
affords an explanation. Moreover, there seems
no way to separate pressure on capacity ceil-
ings that result from customers' concern over
possibleshortages from thepressurethat
would have resulted had this concern, and
the buying that it stimulated, not existed. The
time series are lines on a two dimensional
surface. They are incapable of describing the
crooked wormhole that events bore through
the N-dimensional space.
Without doubt both expectations of short-
ages and actual levels of demand must be in-
volved. But I would like to hazard a guess
that their impacts are not simply additive.
Pressure on capacity that is a function of the
flow of products into final use tends to sen-
sitize the economy to buying waves. Since it
is reasonable to assume that plants are tooled
up to handle at least the basic levels of pre-
vious final use, this pressure may result largely
from the high rate of change in final use.
When pressure of this sort exists, any further
increase in demand (which may be due to
changed expectations, or any of the other
elements that are associated with changes in
the timing of materials buying) will cause
more serious pressure than it otherwise would.
Further, rounds of cause and effect follow. If
this is so, it raises some questions of public
policy with respect to the desirability of en-
couraging manufacturerstomaintainsec-
ond-string idle capacity. It may be that tool-
ing up so that profits are only adequate at
high levels of plant utilization contributes to
instability in the economy at large.
This chapter has tried to hold the influence
ofsalesatarms'length while "other in-
fluences" are examined. Yet there is every rea-
son to believe that these two groups of changes
do not simplytotaltheirinfluences but
change as they combine. Certainly it was not
possible to think about the role of capacity
limitation or any other piece of the total with-
out recognizing the geometry of interplay be-
tween supply, demand, and expectations. Nor
can we conclude the analysis of the dynamics
of the inventory cycle without opening this
troublesome and yet fascinating Pandora's
box.